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The Dangers of Co-Witness Familiarity: Investigating the Effects of Co-Witness 
Relationships on Blame Conformity 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of pre-existing relationships between co-
witnesses on statement similarity, after a post-event discussion. Although research studies have 
attempted to observe the effect of a pre-existing relationship on eyewitness pairs, few have 
investigated these effects on larger groups of co-witnesses. Four hundred and twenty participants 
took part in an eyewitness simulation experiment. Participants were placed into groups of five, 
and viewed video footage of a bar fight. After witnessing the event, participants discussed the 
event with group members before giving individual statements privately. The study employed a 
one-way between subjects design with three conditions; 1) participants discussed the event with 
familiar co-witnesses; 2) participants discussed the event with unfamiliar co-witnesses; and 3) 
participants were not permitted to discuss the event with their co-witnesses (control). It was 
found that post-event discussion between co-witnesses increased the level of similarity in blame 
attribution within the eyewitness groups; however, this difference was only significant in groups 
where eyewitnesses shared a pre-existing relationship. In addition, the level of uncertainty was 
reduced when eyewitnesses took part in post-event discussions.  It is suggested that this might be 
attributed to an increased level of informational influence between familiar co-witnesses. 
However, there was no evidence suggesting that post-event discussions led to an increase in false 
eyewitness statements.  
Keywords: Eyewitness; Statement similarity; Conformity; Blame attribution; Eyewitness 
relationships. 
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1. Background 
Research indicates that both police officers (Kebbell & Milne, 1998) and jurors (Schmechel, 
O’Toole, Easterly, & Loftus, 2006) place a considerable amount of trust in the reliability and 
accuracy of eyewitness evidence. Evidence also suggests that the accuracy of eyewitness 
statements can be significantly tarnished if co-witnesses discuss the event with others prior to 
giving a statement (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008a). The prevalence of post-event discussions 
amongst co-witnesses is high, with survey reports indicating that 86% of real-life eyewitnesses 
discussed their witnessed event with other co-witnesses prior to giving evidence (Paterson & 
Kemp, 2006). The occurrence of such discussions can have significant implications for the 
investigation, with research indicating that eyewitnesses can be influenced by others to recall 
information that they did not witness, a process more commonly referred to as memory 
conformity (Carlucci, Kieckhaefer, Schwartz, Villalba, & Wright, 2010; Gabbert, Memon, & 
Allan, 2003; Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004; Garry, French, Kinzett, & Mori, 2008; 
Hoffman, Granhag, See Kwong, & Loftus, 2001; Paterson & Kemp, 2006).  
1.1.Blame conformity 
During most crimes where the victim can be clearly differentiated from the offender (such 
as a robbery), there will be little contention between co-witnesses regarding who is at fault. 
However, disagreements between co-witnesses are more prevalent within crimes where the task 
of attributing blame to the correct party is more ambiguous (such as a fight between two parties 
or a motor collision involving two drivers) (Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). Research on memory 
conformity suggests that when co-witnesses hold differing recollections of the event, a post-event 
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discussion can cause their individual statements to become more similar (Gabbert et al., 2004; 
Mori, 2003; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). Moreover, research suggests that eyewitnesses can be 
influenced by their co-witnesses when attempting to attribute blame to the correct suspect, a 
process referred to as blame conformity (Mojtahedi, Ioannou, & Hammond, 2017; Thorley, 2015; 
Thorley & Rushton-Woods, 2013). Thorley (2015) demonstrated the effects of blame conformity 
by presenting participants with video footage of a crime taking place and then giving them a 
bogus co-witness statement from a (hypothetical) previous participant. Later, when questioned 
about the event, participants who had read a co-witness statement which blamed an innocent 
bystander for committing the crime were significantly more likely to make the same blame 
attribution error, compared to participants who had not been given a misleading co-witness 
statement. 
Multiple implications can be drawn from the research on blame conformity. An integral 
basis for questioning eyewitnesses is to identify the correct offender (Wells & Olson, 2002). In 
circumstances where there may be contentions between which suspect is at guilt, an eyewitness’s 
statement may be used to determine which potential suspect is at fault. Thus, the research 
findings on blame conformity demonstrate how co-witness discussions could influence multiple 
witnesses into providing false information to the police, which could consequently slow down the 
investigation. Furthermore, through blame conformity, eyewitnesses may then provide incorrect 
testimonies within the courtroom, which may consequently lead to a miscarriage of justice if the 
innocent bystander is convicted.  Based on the severity of these implications, blame conformity is 
perhaps one of the most severe consequences that can arise from a co-witness discussion and, 
thus, blame conformity is the main focus of the present study.  
1.2.Causes of blame conformity 
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1.2.1. Source attribution error 
A large body of research suggests that many eyewitnesses can unintentionally incorporate 
misleading post-event information into their memory reports through source attribution errors, a 
psychological process where post-event information is misattributed as witnessed information 
during memory reconstruction (Cann & Katz, 2005; Schacter, Guerin, & Jacques, 2011; 
Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). Although source attribution errors can explain how witnesses 
may incorporate misinformation into their reports during memory recall tasks (memory 
conformity), the task of blame attribution is a more cognitively demanding process that not only 
requires the witness to recall the event, but also requires them to interpret the information 
correctly, in order to determine which potential suspect is guilty. Owing to this, researchers have 
suggested that blame conformity may be more of a conscious process, facilitated by an 
individual’s need to be correct (Thorley, 2015; Thorley & Rushton-Woods, 2013). 
1.2.2 Informational and normative influence 
Co-witness conformity can also occur intentionally as a result of informational influence 
(Blank, 2009; Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2007; Wright et al., 2000), the 
process of conforming to others to obtain the correct answer (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Due to 
the significant implications that are associated with giving evidence to the police, many witnesses 
will feel pressured to provide accurate information. However, a heightened pressure to perform 
can consequently motivate an eyewitness to report newly learnt misinformation, if they perceive 
the source to be accurate (French, Garry, & Mori, 2011; Williamson, Weber, & Robertson, 2013).  
Normative influence, the pressure to conform as a means for gaining approval and 
acceptance from others, has also been shown to lead individuals to conform to the memory 
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reports of others. Wright et al. (2009) found that during a series collaborative memory recall 
trials, many participants had chosen to conform to their partners’ erroneous reports to avoid 
receiving any negative evaluation from them. However, police investigators are trained to collect 
statements privately (Williamson et al., 2013), suggesting that within a forensic setting, the level 
of normative influence would be reduced (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
Although research indicates that general memory conformity can be facilitated by any of 
these three processes (Loftus, Feldman, & Dashiell, 1995; Wright et al., 2009), Thorley (2015) 
demonstrated that the act of blame conformity was primarily motivated by informational 
influence. More specifically, the study found that participants would only conform to co-
witnesses that they perceived as being competent, suggesting that blame conformity was driven 
by the witness’s need to obtain the correct information.  
The theoretical model of informational influence also dictates that the way an information 
source is perceived will affect how influential it is on the target (Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 
2005; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009; Williamson et al., 2013). More specifically, for informational 
influence to be effective, the target must perceive the source as being more likely to be correct 
than themself (French et al., 2011; Williamson et al., 2013). As a result, the individual 
characteristics of the information source will have an effect on how much influence they have on 
other co-witnesses (Betz, Skowronski, & Ostrom, 1996; Forgas & Williams, 2001). In addition, 
the size of the information source (i.e. the number of individuals presenting the information) has 
also been identified as a mediating factor for informational influence (Bond, 2005). Asch (1951) 
argued that for tasks where there was an obvious correct answer, misinformation would only be 
influential if it was presented by a group of at least three individuals. It can therefore be inferred 
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that the risks of blame conformity will be heavily mediated by both the size and characteristics of 
the source from which the information comes. 
1.3.Co-witness familiarity as a mediator of blame conformity. 
Despite the previous literature concordantly stating that co-witness discussions can 
influence individual statements, most of these studies incorporated experimental designs where 
the participants were strangers to each other (e.g. Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert et al., 2004; 
Meade & Roediger, 2002). Although the utilisation of heterogeneous groups can allow for a 
much easier sampling process (opportunity sampling), the ecological validity of such designs 
may be suspect due to the recurrent tendency for eyewitnesses to have pre-existing relationships. 
A recent survey found that 77% of eyewitnesses are likely to have a previous acquaintanceship 
with another co-witness (Paterson, Chapman, & Kemp, 2007).  
As mentioned previously, research suggests that co-witness influence is highly dependent 
on the source from which the information comes (Hope, Ost, Gabbert, Healey, Lenton, 2008; 
Kwong See, Hoffman, & Wood, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Lampinen & Smith, 1995). 
Moreover, research suggests that eyewitnesses are more likely to conform to the memory reports 
of co-witnesses that they share a pre-existing relationship with, relative to unfamiliar co-
witnesses (French, Garry, & Mori, 2008; Hope et al., 2008). French et al. (2008) found that 
participants were more likely to be misled by the erroneous report of a romantic partner, than 
from the erroneous report of a stranger. Similar effects have been found amongst friends; Hope et 
al. (2008) demonstrated that participants were more likely to be misled by misinformation from a 
friend or romantic partner than from a stranger. Although the aforementioned studies were based 
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on memory recall tasks rather than blame attribution, they highlight the significance of pre-
existing relationships in mediating to co-witness influence.  
The observed relationship between co-witness familiarity and memory conformity may be 
due to an increased level of trust towards familiar co-witnesses. Many relationships are built 
upon, and maintained through, a shared reality, where individuals will be more inclined to agree 
with each other (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005; Sorrentino & Yamaguchi, 2008). 
Consequently, eyewitnesses may be more likely to accept information from such acquaintances 
as a result of an habitual interaction. Research shows that when a conflict in judgement occurs 
between eyewitnesses, individuals are more likely to believe that they are more accurate than a 
stranger, than compared to a friend (Hope et al., 2008). This is because when an eyewitness is 
exposed to information from a stranger, the individual would lack any mental schemas to help 
assess the validity of the conflicting information and would therefore be more inclined to 
disregard their information; whereas when exposed to information from a familiar co-witness, the 
individual can use their pre-existing knowledge about the co-witness to gauge the reliability of 
their judgement (Festinger, 1954; Forgas & Williams, 2001; Gabbert et al., 2007; Kieckhaefer & 
Wright, 2014). Contrastingly, if the individual perceives a familiar co-witness as being 
incompetent or untrustworthy, this could motivate them to disregard their co-witness’s report 
(Claes & Poirer, 1992; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009). 
Another reason why eyewitnesses are more likely to be influenced by familiar co-witnesses 
than by strangers is due to an increased level of likability towards the co-witness. Research on 
social cognition suggests that the likeability of an information source can moderate the level of 
social influence they have (Burger, Soroka, Gonzago, Murphy, & Somervell, 2001; Cialdini, 
2001; Frenzen & Davis, 1990). Hope et al. (2008) explained that eyewitnesses are likely to spend 
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less time evaluating the reliability of a co-witness’s judgement if they find the individual more 
likeable (unless the individual is deemed as being extraordinarily incompetent).  
1.4. Building on the existing co-witness familiarity research. 
Previous literature has made a commendable attempt to investigate the effects of co-witness 
familiarity on statement similarity. However, there are some gaps within the existing literature 
that need to be addressed. 
1.4.1. Pair versus group studies. 
Most research studies investigating eyewitness behaviour have only incorporated 
experimental designs consisting of eyewitness pairs (e.g French et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008; 
Kieckhaefer & Wright, 2014). However, during most crimes there are often additional 
eyewitnesses present (Memon, Dalton, Horry, Milne, Wright, 2012; Paterson & Kemp, 2006; 
Skagerberg & Wright, 2008b), with one survey suggesting that — on average — there are six co-
witnesses present during an incident (Paterson & Kemp, 2006). As mentioned previously, 
research on social influence suggests that co-witness influence could be dependent on the number 
of co-witnesses presenting the misinformation (Bond, 2005). This inference was supported by 
Walther and colleagues, who investigated the relationship between group size (five versus ten) 
and memory conformity and found that co-witness misinformation was more influential when it 
was presented by the larger groups (Walther et al., 2002). On the basis of existing research on 
group size and social influence, the present study postulated that there was a need for new 
research to investigate the effects of co-witness familiarity on blame conformity within larger 
eyewitness groups as, to date, the effects of blame conformity have only been studied on 
eyewitness pairs. 
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1.4.2. Use of confederates. 
Many studies investigating the effects of memory conformity have exposed participants to 
misinformation with the use of confederates (e.g. Kieckhaefer & Wright, 2014; Mckelvey & 
Kerr, 1988). However, the use of confederates can be problematic, as the level of influence a 
confederate has will be highly dependent on their behaviour and characteristics (Ost, Ghonouie, 
Cook, & Vrij, 2008). Due to the need for homogeneous groups, the role of confederate would 
have to be randomly allocated within each group. As a result, this would make it impossible to 
control for the confederate’s characteristics and to prevent these from acting as confounding 
variables. It was therefore the contention of the present study the removal of the use of 
confederates would generate an experimental paradigm that would naturally facilitate 
discrepancies amongst the co-witnesses when attributing blame.   
 
1.5.The Present Study 
The main aim of the present study was to observe the effects of a post-event discussion between 
groups of co-witnesses. Specifically, the research sought to examine whether the relationship 
between co-witnesses impacted on the similarity of their statements with regards to blame 
attribution. To achieve these aims, the study comprised three main objectives. The first objective 
was to establish whether a post-event discussion between co-witnesses could increase the level of 
group similarity in blame attribution. The second objective was to determine whether a pre-
existing relationship between co-witnesses would significantly increase the level of group 
similarity in blame attribution after a post-event discussion. The final objective was to determine 
whether there was a significant difference in blame attribution accuracy between the 
experimental conditions. 
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 The study attempted to build on previous research into co-witness familiarity by 
investigating the effect of post-event discussions between groups rather than pairs. Although 
previous research has shown that an eyewitness can be influenced by misinformation provided by 
an unfamiliar co-witness, it was the contention of the present research that the inclusion of 
multiple co-witnesses would reduce the level of informational influence exerted by the 
individual. The present study also eliminated the need for a confederate by incorporating an 
ambiguous blame attribution task, where co-witnesses were likely to have contradicting views 
regarding which suspect was guilty. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants  
Four hundred and twenty participants (203 males; 212 females; 5 undisclosed) of mixed ages 
(18–83 years; M = 33.04, SD = 15.62) were recruited through opportunity sampling. The project 
was advertised through online media, as well as through the circulation of flyers and posters. The 
advertisement called for five-person groups of individuals with pre-existing relationships and 
also for individual volunteers (who would later be grouped with other unfamiliar participants). 
Participants were not rewarded for their participation. 
In line with previous research (e.g. Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991; Hope et al., 2008), 
participants in groups with pre-existing relationships were required to have known all other group 
members for a minimum of three months. The study recruited groups of individuals with both 
familial and friendship based relations for this condition. 
2.2. Design  
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A one-way between-subjects design was employed, with three conditions. In all three conditions, 
participants were placed into groups of five, to represent a group of co-witnesses, leaving a total 
of 84 groups. In the first condition, participants viewed the footage with strangers; however, no 
group discussion was permitted throughout the experiment (Control condition, N= 32 groups). In 
the second condition, participants viewed the footage and then discussed the witnessed event with 
unfamiliar co-witnesses (Stranger condition, N= 16 groups). In the final condition, participants 
viewed and discussed the witnessed event with individuals that they had a pre-existing 
relationship with (relationship condition, N= 36 groups). Type of relationship was not controlled 
for, as previous research identified no differences in co-witness conformity rates between 
individuals with different forms of pre-existing relationships (Hope et al., 2008). There were 
some discrepancies in sample size between the three conditions, with condition two consisting of 
significantly fewer eyewitness groups (16), relative to conditions one and three (32 and 36, 
respectively). The discrepancy was primarily due to the condition’s requirement for participants 
to be completely unfamiliar with their co-witnesses. There were multiple cases where a 
participant from condition two recognised one of their co-witnesses. Consequently, these groups 
had to be omitted from the study, reducing the overall number of groups within condition two. 
Despite this level of variance, all experimental conditions were still of sufficient size for 
statistical comparisons to be made (in accordance with Stevens, 2009). 
 Two dependent variables were measured. The first dependent variable measured was the 
similarity score in blame attribution within each co-witness group (see below for coding criteria); 
the paper refers to this variable as statement similarity. Secondly, the blame attribution accuracy 
(correct, incorrect, or uncertain) for each individual participant was measured, to determine 
whether co-witness discussions had an effect on blame attribution accuracy. 
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2.3. Materials 
The study used real-life closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of a bar fight between two 
individuals. The footage lasted approximately one minute and thirty seconds, and did not have an 
audio output. The footage depicted two men in distinctively different clothing (one man wearing 
a yellow t-shirt and the other wearing a dark green t-shirt) engaging in a conversation before one 
of the men (dark green t-shirt) attacked the other (yellow t-shirt); shortly after, a physical fight 
took place between the two men before they were separated. 
 
The footage was selected because of the ambiguity regarding who had started the fight, which 
would generate a greater level of variance in the blame attribution of eyewitnesses. An 
independent pilot test (Table 1) found there was a clear distribution in eyewitness blame 
attribution, suggesting that participants within each group would be likely to hold different views 
as to who they believed had started the fight. 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
2.4. Procedure 
Participants took part in the study in a group (either with strangers or acquaintances, depending 
on the experimental condition). Due to the ethical considerations of exposing participants to 
violent footage, participants had to be informed that they would be viewing a CCTV footage that 
contained violence. Details with regards to the aims of the experiment were kept to a minimum. 
 Participants watched the footage simultaneously in their groups on a monitor screen. After the 
footage had finished the second phase of the experiment, the group discussion, began. With the 
exception of the control group, participants were asked to discuss in their groups who they 
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believed had thrown the first hit. The experimenter left the room during the group discussion, to 
eliminate their presence from affecting the participant’s behaviour. Participants in the control 
groups were asked to sit silently until they were called to leave the room for questioning. The 
final phase of the experiment was the eyewitness statement process. Participants were taken into 
a private room individually and asked to identify who they believed had thrown the first hit. 
Participants were instructed to only report information that they remembered seeing. A potential 
risk that the present study had to avoid was the tendency for participants to make a guess when 
attributing blame. By doing so, the participants would have a 50% chance of being correct and 
this would significantly reduce the internal validity of the present study. As a result, all 
participants were directly advised by the interviewer to avoid making any responses through 
guessing. Instead, participants were given the option to state that they were uncertain, if they 
were unable to answer the question.  
2.5. Coding 
Eyewitness’s blame attributions were used as a measure for statement similarity. For this variable 
data was clustered, with each eyewitness group representing an individual data set. Each group 
was scored on the percentage of the most common answer given within the group (i.e. if four out 
of five group members blamed the suspect in the yellow for starting the fight, the group would 
have a similarity score of 80% etc). 
The second outcome variable was eyewitness accuracy. If the participant blamed the man 
in the dark green top for starting the fight they were scored as being correct. If the participant 
blamed the man in the yellow top as starting the fight they were scored as being incorrect. If the 
participant was unsure about who had started the fight they were scored as being uncertain. 
Within the study, three participants blamed a third party (a bystander who separated the fight) for 
starting the fight. Although this answer was incorrect, these participants were scored as “other” to 
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differentiate them from participants who blamed the man in the yellow (also incorrect) for 
starting the fight. 
2.6. Analysis 
A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare the mean 
similarity scores across all conditions. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD were then 
conducted to identify where the significance was located. A chi-squared test was used investigate 
the effects of each experimental condition on eyewitness accuracy. The effect size for all 
significant findings were established, in accordance with Cohen (1988). 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive data 
The control group was used to establish the baseline accuracy of eyewitness blame attributions. 
As shown in Table 2, there was a similar level of correct and incorrect statements (38.8% & 
36.9%, respectively); an additional 22.5% of the participants stated that they were unsure as to 
who had started the fight. The variation of statements within the control group indicated that 
there would be conflicting judgements between group members in the experimental co-witness 
groups (post-event discussion). The data therefore supports the proposition that the footage used 
within the experiment was ambiguous as to who had started the fight. 
The average similarity scores in blame attribution for the control condition were also 
compared in order to establish the a priori rate of statement similarity. There was a mean 
statement similarity score of 60% (SD = 15.86%) within the control group (see Table 3). This 
indicates that, on average, three out of five co-witnesses made the same blame attribution.  
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Table 2. Percentage of participant’s individual blame attribution accuracy between conditions. 
 Correct Incorrect Unsure  
Relationship 53.3.% 41.7% 10.6% 
Stranger 40% 36.3% 23.8% 
Control 38.8% 36.9% 22.5% 
a = a third party blamed for committing the crime (incorrect). 
 
Table 3. Descriptive data for average statement similarity within eyewitness groups. 
 N M  S.D  
Relationship 36 71.11 19.39 
Stranger 16 65 21.29 
Control 32 60 16.06 
 
 
3.2. Unanimity of group statements 
The first objective was to establish whether post-event discussion between co-witnesses could 
increase the level of group similarity in blame attribution. The second objective was to determine 
whether a pre-existing relationship between co-witnesses would significantly increase the level of 
group similarity in blame attribution, after a post-event discussion. In fulfilment of the first and 
second objectives, the mean scores in statement similarity were compared between the three 
experimental conditions (control, strangers, & relationship), to identify if a post-event discussion 
influenced the participant’s blame attribution and to determine whether there was a difference in 
the level of statement similarity between familiar and unfamiliar eyewitness groups. 
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A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to explore the 
impact of the group condition (control = no group discussion permitted; strangers= post-event 
discussion with unfamiliar co-witnesses; and relationship = post-event discussion with familiar 
co-witnesses) on statement similarity. The homogeneity of variance was violated (p < .05), and 
therefore a robust test of equality of means (Welch’s ANOVA) was used. There was a significant 
effect of co-witness familiarity on statement similarity at the p < .05 level for the three 
conditions, F(2, 38.12) = 3.3, p = .048. The difference in mean scores between the groups was 
medium (eta squared =.07).  
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that there was a significant 
difference (p < .05) in mean scores of statement similarity between co-witnesses with pre-
existing relationships (M = 71.11, SD = 19.39) and co-witnesses in the control group (M = 60, SD 
= 16.06). The difference in mean scores was medium (Cohen’s d =.62). There was no significant 
difference (p < .05) in mean scores of statement similarity between co-witness groups with pre-
existing relationships and co-witness groups with no pre-existing relationships (M = 65.71, SD = 
19.03). The difference in mean scores was small (Cohen’s d =.28). There was also no statistically 
significant difference in mean scores of statement similarity between co-witnesses with no pre-
existing relationships and co-witnesses in the control group. The difference in mean scores was 
small (Cohen’s d =.33). 
 
 3.3. Eyewitness blame attribution accuracy 
The final objective was to determine whether there was a significant difference in blame 
attribution accuracy between the experimental conditions. A chi-squared test was carried out to 
see if there was an association between group condition and eyewitness blame attribution. The 
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analysis found that there was a weak significant association between the experimental conditions 
and eyewitness blame attribution; χ2 (6, N = 420) = 19.63, p < .01, φc = .15. An examination of 
the standardized residuals revealed that among participants who had a pre-existing relationship 
with their co-witnesses there were significantly fewer participants stating that they were unsure 
than expected. Participants in this group were significantly more likely to be influenced by their 
co-witnesses, suggesting that participants who were uncertain about the event were more likely to 
conform to co-witnesses. No significant differences were found in the rates of correct or incorrect 
blame attributions between the experimental conditions (p > .05).  
 
4. Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to establish the effects of post-event discussion between groups 
of co-witnesses. Specifically, the study sought to determine whether the relationship between co-
witnesses had an impact on the similarity of their statements in relation to blame attribution 
(blame conformity). The overall results suggest that post-event information from co-witnesses 
can influence the statements of eyewitnesses, but only if the information is presented by familiar 
co-witnesses.  
It must be noted that despite the present study identifying some significant differences in blame 
conformity rates between the experimental conditions, the study was unable to determine the 
cause of blame conformity during the trials. However, as discussed previously, Thorley (2015) 
suggested that the blame conformity was predominantly driven by informational influence. 
Therefore, the following discussion primarily draws on the theoretical construct of informational 
influence when explaining the observations of the present study. 
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4.1. Co-witness influence between strangers 
Results suggest that post-event discussion with strangers did not have a significant effect on 
statement similarity. Although the descriptive data indicated that there was a slightly higher 
percentage of statement similarity when compared with the control group (see Table 3), the 
ANOVA showed that this difference was not significant. This finding is contrary to a large 
proportion of memory conformity literature (see Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert et al., 2004; 
Kieckhaefer & Wright, 2014; Meade & Roediger, 2002). For example, Kieckhaefer and Wright 
(2014) found that eyewitnesses were susceptible to conforming to strangers when placed in co-
witness groups of two. The discrepancies between the findings of the present study and previous 
research findings can be attributed to the difference in group size. Firstly, Kieckhaefer and 
Wright (2014) argued that many eyewitnesses would be inclined to conform to strangers in an 
attempt to avoid receiving any form of negative evaluation from them. In the present study, 
multiple co-witnesses were present and the pilot study data indicates that a mixed collection of 
responses could be expected within each group (Table 1). One theoretical model which has been 
used to explain the relationship between group size and social influence is Social Impact Theory 
(SIT; Latané, 1981). The theory suggests that whilst the strength (status of the individual), 
immediacy (how close they are to the target, both in time and space), and size (how many 
individuals are presenting the information) of a misinformation source can have an increasing 
effect on its level of influence; the number of individuals being subjected to the misinformation 
(target group size) can also have a decreasing effect on the misinformation source’s level of 
influence. Moreover, SIT states that social impact is divided between the individuals being 
targeted (Latane, 1981; Latané & Wolf, 1981); therefore, the impact of any negative evaluation 
would be reduced and, resultantly, participants in bigger groups would be less pressured to 
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conform to the unfamiliar co-witness.. Secondly, participants who are placed in a pair will only 
be exposed to their co-witness’s misinformation. In such an environment, many participants will 
be susceptible to conforming to an unfamiliar co-witness if they lack confidence in their own 
memory reports (Wright et al., 2000). Within the present study, however, participants were 
exposed to the memory reports of four other co-witnesses rather than just one. In contrast to the 
previous research, participants will have therefore been likely to encounter co-witness 
information that supported their memory reports as well information that contradicted it. With 
research indicating that eyewitness confidence is more greatly affected by confirmatory feedback 
than by disconformatory feedback (Allwood, Knutsson & Granhag, 2006), it can be argued that 
participants within the present study will have been less likely to conform to unfamiliar co-
witnesses due to the presence of confirmatory co-witness information.  
Additional research on general social conformity suggests that individuals can conform to a 
group of strangers (Asch, 1952; McKelvey & Kerr, 1988); however, such studies have tested the 
effects of group pressure using unanimous confederates. In such situations, participants were 
placed in an environment where they were against a unanimous group with an opposing 
recollection. The unanimity of misinformation has been proven to be an essential factor for 
eliciting group conformity (Allen & Levine, 1968; Asch, 1955; Hardy, 1957; Malof & Lott, 
1962; Morris & Miller, 1975). This is primarily due to its effects on the level of informational 
influence: if a group unanimously hold the same judgement, the target is more inclined to gauge 
their view as being more accurate (Baron, Vandello, & Brunsman, 1996). In the present study, 
co-witnesses were likely to have differing views, therefore the break in unanimity will have 
reduced the level on informational influence. Based on the differences in the experimental 
designs and variations in the findings of the present study and previous research on memory 
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conformity, it is suggested that the risks of conformity to unfamiliar co-witnesses may only 
emerge when the targeted eyewitness is exposed to co-witness information from either one co-
witness or a group of co-witnesses who are unanimous in their reports.  
 
4.2. Co-witness influence between individuals with pre-existing relationships 
The results did, however, suggest that a post-event discussion with familiar co-witnesses could 
increase the risk of blame conformity. The finding is concordant with the previous literature (e.g. 
French et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008).   
The level of informational influence exerted on an eyewitness affects their likelihood of 
accepting that information as being accurate (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kaplan & Miller, 1987). 
It is argued that individuals are more likely to accept information from people that they know 
than from strangers. As mentioned previously, many relationships are maintained through a 
shared reality (Echterhoff et al., 2005; Sorrentino & Yamaguchi, 2008). Subsequently, many 
eyewitnesses may have been inclined to habitually accept the judgement of a co-witness they 
were close with as part of their behavioural routine. Hope et al. (2008) indicated that individuals 
are more likely to believe that they are more accurate than strangers, in comparison to their 
friends and family. This is primarily due to the fact that an individual will have more information 
about their peers from which to gauge the accuracy of their judgments (Festinger, 1954; Forgas & 
Williams, 2001; Gabbert et al., 2007). This would suggest that within an eyewitness setting an 
eyewitness would be more likely to believe that a co-witness was correct if they had a pre-
existing knowledge of their cognitive skills. Additionally, if a transactive memory system exists 
between co-witnesses, this would increase the chances of a group accepting the information from 
one co-witness, whilst rejecting information from another (Wegner, 1986; Wegner et al.,1991). 
These explanations are supported by additional research: Thorley (2015) found that co-witness 
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conformity was dependent on the eyewitness’s ability to gauge the accuracy of their co-witness. 
Hope et al. (2008) also explained that eyewitnesses are likely to spend less time evaluating the 
reliability of a co-witness’s judgement if they find the individual more likeable. Resultantly, co-
witnesses may be less aware of the inaccuracies of their acquaintances and therefore more likely 
to accept their information as reality. 
The importance of a pre-existing relationship on blame conformity can also be attributed to 
the effects of normative influence brought on by familiar co-witnesses. Walker & Heyns (1962) 
argued that individuals were more likely to conform to people that they self-identified with. This 
would suggest that the similarity between two individuals may mediate the likelihood of 
conformity between them. Previous research on self-attention suggests that this could be due to 
the individual evoking a matching to standard process, where they will interpret the judgement of 
a similar co-witness as the norm and attempt to conform to it (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Mullen, 
1983). Co-witnesses with pre-existing relationships could be more inclined to share similarities 
with each other, therefore they would be more likely to attempt to match each other’s behaviours.  
Post-hoc tests indicated that the differences in statement similarity between participants 
who discussed the event with strangers and participants who discussed the event with familiar-
co-witnesses did not reach statistical significance (d =.28, small effect size, in accordance to 
Cohen, 1988). The findings contradict with the previous findings of French et al. (2008; f =.27) 
and Hope et al. (2008; ϕ =.29) which identified a significant difference in memory conformity 
between strangers and familiar participants (medium size of effects, in accordance to Cohen, 
1988). However, it must be acknowledged that the latter studies observed different outcome 
variables to the present study, looking at memory conformity rates between pairs rather than 
group similarity scores (amongst groups of five participants). It is proposed that despite familiar 
co-witnesses being more inclined to conform to the reports of their peers, a discrepancy between 
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some of the co-witnesses would have meant that participants within the same group may have 
chosen to conform to different co-witnesses. 
 
4.3. Post-event discussion & eyewitness accuracy 
Participants’ individual statements were also compared across all conditions to investigate the 
effect of post-event discussion on blame attribution accuracy. Despite the data suggesting that 
eyewitnesses can be influenced by familiar co-witnesses, there was no evidence suggesting that 
this will result in an increase in false eyewitness statements. The distribution between correct and 
incorrect statements remained relatively constant across all conditions (see Table 2), with no 
significant differences found. Findings did, however, suggest that eyewitnesses were significantly 
less likely to be uncertain after discussing the event with familiar co-witnesses. This suggests that 
eyewitnesses who are more uncertain about an event will be significantly more susceptible to 
being influenced by others around them. This proposition is supported by previous research that 
has identified a positive relationship between uncertainty and susceptibility to informational 
influence (Smith et al., 2007; Walther, Bless, Strack, Rackstraw, & Wagner, 2002). Despite the 
results finding no evidence to suggest that post-event discussions can have a negative effect on 
eyewitness accuracy, the results do suggest that uncertain eyewitnesses will be more inclined to 
make accusations based on the judgements of their peers - a behaviour that might consequently 
create unreliable courtroom evidence. Another implication of the findings presented in Table 2 is 
that participants who discussed the event with familiar co-witnesses were more likely to make a 
decisions and thus, were more likely to be sure on who they believed had initiated the assault. 
This observation of reduced uncertainty suggests that eyewitnesses who discuss an event with 
familiar co-witnesses may become more confident in their blame attributions. This could have 
negative consequences on a criminal investigation as previous research has indicated that 
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confident witnesses will be more influential on both jurors and other co-witnesses (Goodwin et 
al., 2013; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). However, due to the present study failing to measure 
eyewitness confidence, more direct evidence is needed to support this inference. 
 
4.4. Limitations 
Whilst the present study extends the previous literature by investigating the relationship 
between co-witness familiarity and statement similarity within large eyewitness groups, there are 
a number of limitations which need to be acknowledged and which future research should seek to 
address in order to unpack the relationships between co-witness familiarity and blame conformity 
further. 
The results suggest that possible interaction effects may exist between co-witness 
familiarity and post-event discussions; however, only unfamiliar eyewitness groups were 
included in the control condition in the present study. Through incorporating a 2x2 design, where 
both familiarity and group discussion could be manipulated, future research should aim to 
identify if statement similarity is predominately caused by informational influence or similarities 
in the way familiar co-witnesses remember events. 
Although a distinct criterion was set for recruiting eyewitness groups with pre-existing 
relationships, the nature of each relationship - as well as duration - was not considered in the 
analyses. Focusing on these variables would allow future research to measure the moderating 
effects relationship characteristics may have on statement similarity.  
The present study incorporated a single blame attribution task to measure statement 
similarity. Although the task was able to accurately simulate the process of eyewitness blame 
attribution, there were only three potential responses, meaning that there was not much room for 
variability in both response accuracy and statement similarity. By including additional 
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information from the participants’ memory reports when assessing response accuracy and 
statement similarity, richer data with greater levels of variation could be obtained. This would 
allow the researchers to make more detailed comparisons between familiar and unfamiliar co-
witnesses. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In summary, the present findings suggest that co-witnesses with pre-existing relationships 
are at risk of contaminating each other’s statements. This could have detrimental effects on the 
investigation process if one of the co-witnesses were to relay false information about the event. 
The following suggestions are made for counteracting such effects: Kieckhaefer & Wright (2014) 
emphasised the importance of police officers identifying whether eyewitnesses had discussed the 
event with others prior to giving their statements. The present study supports this proposal; by 
establishing if any post-event discussion had occurred, officers will be able to form a better 
assessment of the statements given. Additionally, in agreement with French et al. (2008), it is 
suggested that police officers should attempt to identify whether co-witnesses who discussed the 
event had a pre-existing relationship and for this information to be taken into consideration by 
both investigators and those within the judicial system. It must be noted that, although inferred, 
there is no evidence indicating an effective intervention technique for helping eyewitnesses 
improve their source attribution skills when giving an eyewitness statement. Therefore, a more 
practical implication of the present findings and the next direction for future research to take will 
be to identify effective intervention techniques in reducing the rate of misinformation recall from 
co-witnesses. 
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